The Dangers of Optimism in War

The Ukrainians Face a Daunting Task - Don't Kid Yourself Otherwise

The stage is set for Ukraine to launch its much-anticipated counterpunch in earnest.  The Kerch Bridge is still unable to carry rail cargo. That coupled with the recent damage to the Chonhar Bridge¹ means logistics from Crimea to Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are as bad as they’ve been since the war began.  Additionally, weeks of long-range strikes on Russian command and control and ammunition depots translate into uncoordinated and ill-equipped defenders left in trench lines.  But at a certain point, the bridges will be repaired, the stockpiles refilled, and the command structures rebuilt, these next few weeks offer as good a chance as any for Ukrainian forces to take the fight to their enemy.

Western trainers, impressed by the capabilities of their Ukrainian trainees, boosted the coming offensive and suggested victory would follow short, sharp fights with a demoralized Russian force.  It’s understandable that they, and those in the media who parroted their optimism, believed this, but it’s a classic example of ‘war optimism’.  On the eve of every grand campaign, the side preparing to go over the top always believes victory is theirs for the taking.  What’s the classic phrase? The war will be over by Christmas! Everyone believes the next battle they initiate will leave them victorious, otherwise, why would they attack?  Yet, touring the history of armed conflict, fields across the world are littered with dead men who just 20 minutes before daydreamed of marching in triumph through their capital city.

You, dear reader, are far more sophisticated than the average Joe and do not succumb to the propaganda peddled by shills in the media.  As we move further into the Summer and the Ukrainian offensive takes shape, there are a few things to consider:

1. Local fires superiority can be achieved, but theatre-wide fires still favor the Russians.

The Ukrainians will use artillery preparation before launching any assault.  Aside from that, they will have access to real-time fire missions to support forces while they attack Russian lines.  The systems supplied to them, 155mm howitzers, HIMARS, and various large caliber mortars are good systems that match if not exceed their Russian counterparts.  Ukrainian artillerists have proven to be adept at coupling drone spotters with forward infantry to execute effective fire missions.  However, the issue becomes do they have enough fire support to spare if a breach in Russian lines forms.  The choice they face is either to pull what precious few systems they have into the breach to assist follow-up operations, putting them at risk, or hold them back.  If they choose the latter, they risk sapping their own offensive potential.  If they choose the former, they risk losing some of the most effective equipment they have to counterbattery fire and aviation. It’s simply a fact the Russians possess more firepower than the Ukrainians do and can concentrate that firepower where needed. Rest assured they will not hesitate to do so.

Russian 152mm self-propelled howitzers on parade

2. No way to establish air supremacy.

Speaking of aviation, the Ukrainians stand no chance, no matter what they do, of establishing air superiority over the battlefield.  The Russians possess a layered air defense consisting of larger missiles like the S300 or S400 as well as shorter-range man-portable SAMs that a single soldier can operate.  Additionally, they have thus far not risked their air dominance fighters like the SU-27s or SU-35s and still possess hundreds of air-to-air and air-to-ground attack planes.  This means Ukrainian breakouts will not have the advantage of air support to lean on should they require it.  And, as is always the case, if Ukrainian forces move deeper into Russian-held territory, they push past their own air defense umbrella and put themselves at risk of aerial attack. As we’ve already seen this is becoming a greater issue.²

3. The manpower differential favors the Russians and they have the advantage of being on the defensive.

Offensive operations are usually costlier in lives than defensive ones.  The exception to this is when a defender counterattacks, but in effect the sides have shifted between attacker and defender so you could argue the rule still holds even in that case.  The Ukrainians throughout most of 2022 and the early part of 2023 enjoyed favorable casualty ratios because they were often the defender.  If we look at the Kherson push in October and November 2022, one example of the Ukrainians attacking Russian positions, this proved to be quite costly and only resulted in Ukrainian victory after the Russians elected to vacate the Right Bank of the Dnipro.  Even with significant resistance to the war in Russia, they still possess a larger pool of available manpower to lean on as the war progresses.  Perhaps more critical than that fact is Ukraine will be committing the troops trained by Western powers to the fight.  Losing these men, given the level of investment put into them, is costlier than Russia losing half-trained conscripts.  Ukrainian war planners face the impossible position of needing to both preserve their forces but also commit them to bloody battles in order to demonstrate their country’s viability for success.

Zelensky visits a wounded solider in hospital - photo via Reuters

4. The Russians are increasingly reliant on inexpensive and domestically produced weapons such as landmines.  Ukraine increasingly relies on expensive Western-supplied weapons that are difficult to maintain and cannot be produced at home.

While everyone in Kyiv celebrates the arrival of Leopard IIs and Bradley IFVs, these systems create a new set of problems for Ukraine.  The Russians, unable to access international markets, must rely mainly on their own domestic arms industry which, given the legacy of the Soviet Union, is extensive.  Despite this shortcoming, they have built out defensive belts using landmines, dragons’ teeth, and ditch digging.  Hard to find a cheaper means of halting an armored thrust.  Ukraine has an order of magnitude fewer factories than Russia and increasingly relies on Western transfers to support itself.  An antitank landmine might only cost a few hundred dollars to make, but the Bradley it cripples, and the men inside, are worth millions of dollars.  It’s a cost imbalance that Kyiv depends on the US and EU to maintain.

An illustrated graphic via the New York Times showing the obstacles facing Ukrainian forces

5. Even a demoralized force can hold a trench line and offer modest resistance, which can often be enough.

While a difficult thing to measure, one could safely assume Russian morale is not at its apex.  The abortive assaults in the Winter left many units weakened and desperate for some success to reinvigorate themselves.  Defending your position against Ukrainian attackers armed with Western kit would do exactly that.  Looking at history, the example of the French Mutinies of 1917³ comes to mind.  After suffering horrendous casualties at the Battle of Aisne, thousands of French soldiers refused to attack again when ordered.  The mutineers told their commanders that they would defend their trenches but would no longer go over the top. One could easily see similar conversations happening in Russian trench lines today. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians that still means overcoming an enemy prepared to fight for his position.    

6. Geography favors the defender.

The geography of the current battlefield lends itself to the defender not just because of how exposed an attacker must make himself on the wide-open fields of Southern Ukraine, but also because the frontage has shrunk by hundreds of miles since April 2022.  Both sides have raised huge numbers of conscripts in the months since the war broke out, men that are now packed into a smaller space given the pullbacks from Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.  The simple arithmetic of X number of men covering Y number of miles means weak spots, like the one in Kharkiv last autumn, are much harder to find.  Tactics like feints, in-echelon attacks, or false routs could create weaknesses in Russian lines, albeit the enemy must cooperate for one to form, but simply stumbling upon 20 miles of lightly guarded front likely won’t happen again.

A nameless field in Ukraine - The endless vistas of the Eurasian Steppe cover much of the county, leaving scant cover for any would-be attacker

The upshot here is to temper expectations of what is possible for Ukraine to achieve this year.  Two articles in the NY Times, one by Tom Friedman⁴, and another by the news team Tom Gibbons-Neff, Josh Holder, and Marco Hernandez⁵ illustrate the monumental task of overcoming Russian defenses, particularly in the South. 

Over the next few weeks, expect many more stories about the difficulties of offensive operations.  That said, war is by its nature unpredictable.  Perhaps another Prigozhin is waiting in the wings to turn his forces into rebels and reverse Russia’s course in the war.  Perhaps whole brigades of Russian regulars will melt away in the face of overwhelming firepower.  Or perhaps not.  Always be on guard for wishful thinking in matters such as these.  History is littered with the corpses of brave men whose only mistake was ill-advised optimism.

1. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-hits-bridge-linking-crimea-mainland-blow-russian-supply-route-2023-06-22/

2. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-armor-appears-to-have-a-russian-attack-helicopter-problem

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1917_French_Army_mutinies

4. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/opinion/putin-russia-ukraine.html

5. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-counteroffensive-obstacles.html